Agrarian modernization, land conflicts, and peasant mobilization in Russia and Argentina by Visser, A. & Bidaseca, K.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/90709
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-06 and may be subject to
change.
296
AGRARIAN MODERNIZATION, LAND CONFLICTS, AND PEASANT 
MOBILIZATION IN RUSSIA 
AND ARGENTINA 
Oane Visser, Karina Bidaseca 
Editorial note. This joint conclusion is based on the papers by Visser and Bidaseca 
published in this issue of Laboratorium. See these papers for authors’ contact 
information.
The current neoliberal agrarian policies in Russia and Argentina (and the former 
Soviet Union and Latin America at large) have been strongly inﬂ uenced by the 
Western agribusiness model of the agrarian economy.1 Following periods of state-led 
agrarian development (a planned economy until 1991 in Russia and a state-led 
market economy in Argentina until 1990), the rural sector in these countries is now 
characterized by free prices and relatively free import and export policies. In both 
countries, actors (governments, agribusinesses, or academics) in search of 
international models or partners predominantly looked to the highly productive 
agriculture in the West. In Russia, for example, Western advisors from the World Bank 
were involved in the design of privatization and liberalization policies in Russia in 
the early 1990s. In addition, as international farm consultancy and farm exchange 
programs originate in the West, and, furthermore, Russian agrarian academics have 
mainly used Western agriculture as a yardstick for comparison.
Interestingly, Michel Orloff, a former director of the Moscow ofﬁ ce of the U.S. 
Agribusiness Carlyle Group and scion of a Russian noble family, said a visit to Argentina 
in the early 2000s inspired him to invest in Russian agriculture. He saw large 
landowners making proﬁ ts without government subsidies and envisaged a similar 
model for Russia that would hark back to the noble estates of his family history, but 
lubricated by modern ﬁ nance (Kramer 2008).
1 As described in Visser (2010), in Russia in the early 1990s, private family farms were promoted 
by Western advisors based on a ideal type of Western agriculture, while in reality in the U.S. 
corporate farms owned by agribusinesses were becoming increasingly dominant in e.g. hog 
and poultry production, at the expense of family farms. Since the mid-1990s, Russian policy 
and Western consultancy have focused on large-scale farms.
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In fact, the rural economies of Russia and Argentina (and some of the other large 
former Soviet and Latin American countries) are, in many ways, more similar to each 
other than to the West. Economically, as mentioned above, both countries have 
drastically liberalized economies, following extended periods of state intervention. 
Geographically, they have vast tracts of scarcely populated land whose production 
potential is as yet unrealized. Institutionally, they are characterized by insecure 
property rights and weak institutions, in contrast with the West. Further, both 
countries have a very heterogeneous sector with, on the one hand, huge agribusinesses 
operating large tracts of lands (exceeding the size of large businesses in the U.S.), 
and, on the other hand, very small (semi-)subsistence peasant smallholdings.
There are two main differences between the agricultural lives of the two 
countries, namely the role of the state and the degree of urbanization. The most 
important of these factors is the role of the state, which is larger in Russia. An 
important means of state inﬂ uence in Russia is the subsidization of investment 
projects, which enables the state to set formal or informal requirements regarding 
the type of investments permitted. Further, the state can put pressure on farm 
enterprises through controlling agencies, such as those in charge of overseeing 
hygiene and environmental protection, for example. Argentina is more urbanized 
than Russia. In Russia, 27 percent of the population lives in the countryside (with 
roughly one-tenth of the working-age population employed in agriculture, whose 
share of the GDP is 4 percent).2 In Argentina, on the other hand, only 11 percent of 
the population is rural.3
Despite the similarities mentioned above, to our knowledge there has been 
virtually no comparison of agrarian developments in Russia and Argentina, certainly 
not from a social scientiﬁ c, ethnographically-informed perspective. In this brief 
concluding article drawing on the separate articles on Argentina (by Bidaseca) and 
Russia (by Visser) in this issue, we will discuss some remarkable similarities, and also 
some interesting differences, between agrarian developments in both countries. In 
doing so, we will focus on the development of the “agribusiness” model in both 
countries and the related process of land accumulation, as well as their effects upon 
conﬂ icts over land and social mobilization.
CONCENTRATION OF LAND AND DEVELOPMENT 
OF THE AGRIBUSINESS MODEL
Both Russia and Argentina are vast, relatively sparsely populated countries, with 
a huge potential for further agrarian growth, which will become increasingly attractive 
for foreign and domestic investors.
2 The share of agriculture in GDP in Russia was 4.1% in 2008 (Russian Ministry of Agriculture: 
www.mcx.ru/documents/document/show_print/10553.204.htm), down from 16.4% in 1990.
3 Over the past 10 years, the share of agriculture (farming sector and agroindustry) in Argen-
tina represented in average 11.2 percent of GDP and 54.5 percent of exports. From 2002 to 
2005, Argentinean agriculture grew by 21%, representing an average annual growth rate of 
5% (www.sagpya.mecon.gov.ar).
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According to the National Institute for Agricultural Technology (Valente 2008), 
Argentina is estimated to have the potential to produce food for 380 million people, 
nearly 10 times its population. In Russia, roughly one-sixth or 35 million hectares are 
laying fallow, and according to former Minister of Agriculture Gordeev speaking at 
the “Green Week” in Berlin in early 2009, Russia could potentially provide food for 
450 million people, or three times its current population. With the prospects of 
increasing demand for food worldwide and soaring food prices, agriculture in these 
countries has increasingly attracted the gaze of domestic (and foreign) investors.
In both countries large privately operated farms have concentrated increasing 
amounts of land in their hands, a process which accelerated in the 2000s through the 
involvement of agroholdings. More generally, concentration of land ownership has 
been a feature of the countryside for at least a few decades, but the speed and the 
kind of actors involved differ.
In Argentina, a strong process of land concentration took place as early as the 
1970s. As shown in Bidaseca’s article (this volume), based on the 1988 and 2002 
censuses, the number of farms decreased by nearly a quarter, while their average size 
increased by 28 percent to 538 hectares. Moreover, 1.3 percent of the proprietors 
own 43 percent of all land, although it should be noted that (as in Russia) it is difﬁ cult 
to get precise data about the accumulation of land by agroholdings.
In Russia, land accumulation by private actors is a new phenomenon, but since 
the collectivization of the late 1920s the average size of farm enterprises has 
continuously risen, reaching approximately 8,000 hectares in the 1980s. Once 
agriculture had been collectivized by the middle of the 1930s, this concentration 
took place within the large-scale collective sector, not at the expense of small-scale 
farming as in Argentina. In Russia, most of the agricultural land was already occupied 
by the large-scale (collective) farms. The size of private (subsidiary) household plots 
was very small from the start of collectivization (at about a tenth to a quarter of 
a hectare) and remained more or less stable until the end of the Soviet system. With 
the introduction of privatization policies in the early 1990s, the average size of 
agricultural producers in terms of acreage fell due to the emergence of private family 
farms and occasional splits of collective farms into two or three smaller farm 
enterprises. Nevertheless, the farm enterprises (the former collective and state 
farms) remained very large in size (nearly 6,000 hectares on average in 2002). 
Furthermore, since the early 2000s agroholdings have emerged and a renewed process 
of land concentration is taking place, now through the private sector.
The accumulation of land by large farm enterprises which are privately operated 
instead of collective- or state-operated is a more recent phenomenon in Russia (Visser, 
this issue), but in both countries the acceleration of land accumulation by agroholdings 
(together with growing investments) started mainly in the 2000s. Again, the 
development in Argentina was more gradual, with the entry of heavily capitalized 
agroholdings following and reinforcing, much earlier processes of accumulation and 
modernization by large commercial farm enterprises. Land accumulation and 
investments by agroholdings in Russia form much more of a  atershed in agrarian 
development, and occur at a high speed. While large agroholdings controlled 4 percent 
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of Russia’s farmland in 2003, by 2008 they had some 10 percent of land in lease or 
ownership, according to the institute for Agricultural Market Studies in Moscow (Bush 
2008). Moreover, in the most productive regions they occupy more than a quarter of the 
land.
In both countries, the involvement of agribusiness has gone hand in hand with 
a shift from livestock (mainly dairy) farming to crop farming. While in Russia 
agroholdings tend to focus on grain production or pig or poultry farming, in various 
regions they continue (less proﬁ table) dairy farming due to pressure from local 
authorities to keep up employment. In Argentina, agroholdings are more strongly 
associated with monoculture (soy) production, with negative effects for the 
sustainability of agriculture.
There are a few important differences in the development of the agribusiness 
model in Russia and Argentina. As suggested above, in Argentina the modernization 
of agriculture through improvements in technology and production has been a more 
gradual development, than in Russia where it is a relatively recent phenomenon that 
(re)started in about the early 2000s. In Russia the sharp overall economic decline 
and lack of capital led to a widespread de-mechanization and decrease of production 
in the 1990s. The earlier start of mechanization in agribusinesses in Argentina 
enabled an increase in production for various crops and an expansion of export 
agriculture. This, in combination with the incentive to acquire mortgages, led to an 
overvaluation of land, whereas in Russia land prices were extremely low in the 1990s, 
and only started to rise signiﬁ cantly in the mid-2000s.
The longer process of liberalization of the (agrarian) economy in Argentina has 
created an agrarian sector which is more international in various respects, albeit 
generally to the detriment of the prospects of the small-scale farming sector. In 
Argentina, foreign investors are strongly involved in the agribusinesses, and 
Argentinean agroholdings also rent land in neighboring countries, mainly Paraguay 
(Gras 2008:7). As Bidaseca notes in her paper, 17 million hectares of land (roughly 
one-tenth of all agricultural land) is owned by foreign companies. El Tejar, for 
example, owns 180,000 hectares of land in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, and Uruguay. 
The agroholding Adecoagro operates 220,000 hectares in Argentina, Brazil, and 
Uruguay. 
In Russia, foreign companies and persons can lease, but not own, land. 
Nevertheless, since the mid-2000s, foreign companies are becoming more involved in 
agriculture through lease of land or via shares in Russian companies (Bush 2008; 
Visser and Spoor 2010).
CONFLICTS OVER LAND AND SOCIAL MOBILIZATION
In both countries, in a context of insecure property rights and difﬁ cult legal 
enforcement of rights for peasants, the accumulation of land by agribusinesses often 
conﬂ icts with the rights and prospects of the peasant farming sector. (For a brief 
discussion of the term “peasant” and further references to studies that discuss the 
connotations of the term in Russia in greater detail, see Visser, this issue.)
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In the Santiago del Estero region in Argentina where Bidaseca did her ﬁ eldwork, 
this conﬂ ict is very pronounced. Historically this North-Western Argentine region 
was agriculturally and economically poor, with a predominance of small subsistence 
farms and very few large estates, which have been characteristic of the Pampas for 
many generations.
In recent decades, agribusinesses in their appetite for more land are expanding 
in the Santiago region. Bidaseca (this volume) pointed out that over half of the 
territory worked by peasants in the Santiago region concerns precarious land tenure 
(the highest percentage in Argentina), with land distributed by accidental contract, 
occupation or other informal regimes. Farm land which for generations has been 
worked communally, is insufﬁ ciently recognized as communal property, as private (or 
state) ownership of land is the sole form of ownership that is recognized by law. The 
expansion of agribusinesses in this environment of insecurity of land titles held by 
peasants led to an increase and intensiﬁ cation of conﬂ icts over land.
In Russia, the intensiﬁ cation of conﬂ icts over land is an even more recent 
phenomenon, though less pronounced than in Argentina. In the early 1990s, when 
the former collective and state farms were privatized, sometimes conﬂ icts occurred 
between farm employees who wanted to take out their shares to start their own 
private family farm and management, which as a rule tried to keep the large farm 
enterprises intact. Management for instance tried to obstruct such partitions by 
giving new farmers the worst parts of the land. However, as the number of employees 
willing to start a private farm was very limited (mostly just one or two in a farm 
enterprise with several hundreds of workers), this did not lead to widespread protest. 
The average farm worker had little knowledge about the privatization process, and in 
most cases the workers’ assembly voted unanimously for the privatization variant 
proposed by their management. At the end of the 1990s, years after privatization was 
formally concluded, about half of the shares were used by farm enterprises without 
any formalities covering leases or investments. Many of the shares ofﬁ cially recorded 
as issued to the employees never left the safes of the farm enterprise management 
(Uzun 1999).
In the 1990s farm enterprises continued to operate in largely the same way as 
before privatization. Farm employees were treated as workers and not as shareholders 
(with the crucial difference that wages were often very low and payment signiﬁ cantly 
delayed). The workers received social services and products for their household plots 
as before. The farm employees did not care too much about their rights regarding the 
shares; they kept their job at the farm enterprise (and continued working their small 
private plots), and land was practically worthless (or even a burden, as some tax had 
to be paid for the land).
In the course of the 2000s this began to change. With the increased proﬁ tability 
of agriculture, an increasing number of agroholdings started leasing or buying up 
large tracts of land, and the value of land has increased (from 2006 to 2008 the value 
doubled in the well-endowed agricultural areas, although the ﬁ nancial crisis has 
slowed down this rise in prices). As a result, the precise entitlements to land and 
assets have become more important. This is especially true since investments by 
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agroholdings entail mechanization, increased productivity, and layoffs, forcing more 
rural dwellers to fall back on subsistence farming.
The actors and mechanisms in this process of accumulation are somewhat 
different. In Argentina, accumulation by large agribusinesses basically occurs at the 
cost of the family farming sector (Bidaseca, this issue). Agribusinesses get land from 
indebted family farms, which have their land auctioned off by banks or their creditors. 
In Russia this is hardly ever the case. Land is predominantly held by farm enterprises. 
Investors therefore accumulate land by buying or renting it from the shareholders of 
these enterprises. The acreage of land held by private family farms is too small to 
attract the attention of investors. Moreover, as the value of land is rather low in 
Russia, private family farms have difﬁ culty obtaining loans. Consequently, 
bankruptcies and auctions of private farm land by banks are less common.
The difference in the intensity and duration of land accumulation by agri-
businesses, as well as differences in the socio-economic structure of rural society 
(see below) lead to a different articulation of conﬂ icts over land in both countries. 
In particular, one can observe crucial differences in the scale and way in which 
competing claims over land lead to peasant resistance and mobilization.
Firstly, in Argentina there is considerable collective peasant resistance compared 
with Russia. In the current democratic context, protest takes the form of legal action, 
but also, as in the case of El Ceibal for example, the use of petitions or road blocks. 
Considered in a broader Latin American context, Argentina appears to be a country 
with limited peasant mobilization. However, if one takes into account that Argentina 
is not a peasant country (unlike Mexico or Bolivia), mobilization is actually very 
substantial. In the 1970s, the Agrarian League was a very important movement for 
peasants and farmers, with 20,000 member families and 54,000 youth members 
(Bidaseca 2009). Here, as in Russia, the short lifespan of the current, more or less 
democratic system (since 1983 in Argentina and 1991 in Russia), with civil liberties 
allowing functioning grassroots movements, plays an important role. During the 
Argentinean dictatorship, infringements on peasant land rights by large farm 
enterprises took place in Santiago de Estero as early as the end of the 1960s. However, 
in the context of a repressive regime they triggered little open protest and took the 
form of “silent evictions.” Currently, although countrywide protest movements are 
limited in Argentina, compared with Brazil with its well-developed Landless Rural 
Workers’ Movement (MST), on the regional level there are strongly developed 
movements such as the Santiago del Estero Peasant Movement (MOCASE), which has 
approximately 10,000 member families.
In Russia, the countrywide private family farmers association AKKOR, which was 
active from the start of privatization in the beginning of the 1990s, lost much of its 
inﬂ uence, already very limited in any case, when the emergence of private family 
farms stagnated in the mid 1990s. The more recent Krest’ianskii Front (which can be 
translated as Peasant or Farmers’ Front), which was established in 2003 and currently 
has over 15,000 members in 20 regions, seems to have broader appeal, as it targets a 
wider constituency of not only private farmers, but also farm workers and all kinds of 
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small land owners. However, the impact of this new movement, both countrywide and 
regionally, still remains very limited.
Secondly, apart from the scale of collective protests and the size of peasant 
movements, it is also relevant to note differences in the networks and alliances of 
the peasant movements. In Argentina, the longer established peasant movements 
have made alliances with other peasant organizations, NGOs, and organizations in 
urban areas. In the case of El Ceibal, the peasants cooperated not only with other 
peasant organizations and local NGOs, but also built an alliance with migrants from 
their area living in Buenos Aires, who supported them ﬁ nancially in their legal 
struggle to keep their land. Furthermore, Argentinean peasant movements (such as 
MOCASE) have also established international links, for instance within the large 
international peasant association Via Campesina (Borras 2008).4 In Russia, by 
contrast, the peasant movement’s links with other organizations and urban actors 
are weak, although it should be noted that the Farmers’ Front also includes dacha 
(urban garden plot) owners among its members. The peasant movement predominantly 
focused on increasing its foothold in Russia itself. Via Campesina does not include 
Russian organizations, and indeed has hardly any member organizations from 
postsocialist Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. So far there is no sign of 
international alliances established by the Farmers’ Front. It should be noted that 
AKKOR and the German farmer association Deutscher Bauernverband recently came to 
an ofﬁ cial agreement on cooperation. AKKOR has also organized visits to the US. 
These forms of cooperation are mostly focused on technical aspects of agriculture 
and not so much on issues such as land rights, capacity building, or mobilization. The 
only party directly representing the countryside is the Russian Agrarian Party, which 
did not obtain enough votes to pass the 7% barrier in the 2007 parliamentary 
elections. Moreover, it is not an opposition movement, having merged with the 
governing United Russia party in 2008.
In his article, Visser discusses several factors that explain the limited collective 
protest by peasants in Russia as compared to Argentina. A general factor is the legacy 
of 70 years of communism, which has left the population unaccustomed to open 
forms of protest and mobilization, although it should be noted that the dictatorship 
which was in place in Argentina from 1976 to 1983 also had a negative effect on 
mobilization. The demographic situation in Russia, with an older rural population 
than in Argentina, also works against peasant mobilization, which is often driven by 
young or middle-aged people. In Russia in the 1990s, the number of young people 
declined sharply. The share of people below working age went down from 24 percent 
in 1990 to 16 percent in 2006, with 20 percent above working age and 63 percent of 
working age (Rosstat 2007:66–71). In most of the Russian countryside, the population 
is even older. In Argentina, by contrast, the share of young people in the general 
population is 40 percent, and the share of old people is around 10 percent. Finally, 
4 The MOCASE has split into two organizations: MOCASE Via Campesina (which has an 
alliance with Via Campesina) and MOCASE (which has no such alliance). Both orga-
nizations dispute the name of MOCASE.
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the Russian press hardly pays any attention to peasant protests, which hinders the 
growth of such movements.
With regard to other factors, we have to make a distinction between two types 
of Russian peasants: private family farmers and household plot holders (the latter are 
often employed by farm enterprises). The virtual absence of protest by private 
farmers can be attributed to a large extent to the small number of such private 
farmers per region/district, which makes collective action difﬁ cult. The low degree of 
collective protest by farm workers has to do with the paternalistic role of farm 
enterprise managers, who provide supports for the household plots of the villagers 
and often offer a range of social services to the community. Such dependent 
relationships hinder the emergence of open protest. Finally, the fact that rural 
dwellers normally have their small household plots in addition to their land shares in 
the farm enterprises means that they can get by even when they lose their land 
shares. This fallback option has the beneﬁ t of giving them more security in the short 
term (in comparison with Argentinean peasants, who may become completely 
landless), but at the same time lessens the impetus to protest and obscures any 
visionof permanent positive change in their position.
In sum, the process of land accumulation and increasing inﬂ uence by 
agribusinesses has lead to low levels of collective protest in Russia compared to 
Argentina, which is a result of the duration of the process, the speciﬁ c demographic 
context, and the socio-economic legacy, including the speciﬁ c (informal) property 
relations.
With the ongoing process of globalization, and agribusinesses that become 
larger and more international, it is to be expected that peasant movements will also 
become more international if they want to offer an alternative to, or mold to their 
local needs, the ongoing growth of the agribusiness model in the agricultural sector. 
Over time, not only might an occasional Russian manager visit Argentina (or vice 
versa), but connections between Russian and Argentinean peasant movements 
(whether digital or face-to-face) might become a new feature of the agricultural 
landscape.
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